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1 Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal 
Academy, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 333, 348 (1996); (quoting Frances Olsen, 
The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS Oꜰ  LAW 453, 454 (David Kairys ed. 1990)). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 There is a place that exists – a place that is free from liability 
for any harmful harassment, willful and wanton untruths, as well as 
malicious lies and tortious acts.2 This place protects, with impunity, 
offenders of domestic violence (“DV”) who choose to enter its 
doors to continue abusing their victims.3 This place is a safe haven 
for continued DV because every threatening, intimidating, and 
demeaning publication directed toward a DV victim is absolutely 
privileged and perfectly legal.4 This place, commonly referred to as 
the local courthouse, strictly obeys the common law rule of absolute 
privilege. Absolute privilege, a legal doctrine grounded in public 
policy which can be traced back to medieval England, allows DV 
abusers unfettered, legal access to their victims. 5  Absolute 
                                                
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997) (“[T]he privilege is absolute . 
. . irrespective of [the attorney’s] purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, 
his belief in its truth, or even his knowledge of its falsity.”). 
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997) (as long as the continued 
abuse concerns communications related to preliminary or continuing judicial 
proceedings); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an 
Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic 
Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,168-69 (2012) (emphasis 
added). 
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997) (“An attorney at law is 
absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the 
institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which 
he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.”); Donna J. 
King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of 
a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE 
GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,168-69 (2012). 
5  See Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 885 (Conn. 2013)(The privilege is 
considered “as old as the law itself.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 
(1997); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's 
Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 
TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,168-69 (2012) (explaining that absolute 
privilege allows even pro se litigants access to the courts for the purposes of 
harassing and threatening litigation tactics without fear of consequences) 
(emphasis added). 
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privilege’s main purpose is to “secur[e for] attorneys as officers of 
the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for 
their clients.”6 The privilege applies “irrespective of the [attorney’s] 
purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its truth, 
or even his knowledge of its falsity[,]” making it the perfect weapon 
for a DV offender to deploy against his victim.7 
 Since the founding of the United States, women have been, 
and continue to be, institutionally and systematically discriminated 
against, particularly within American society and its judicial 
system.8 From the common law doctrine of coverture and court 
sanctioned sex-discrimination, to the suffrage movement and fault-
based divorce, women experience discrimination by men in a 
variety of ways and means.9 Prior to the U.S. Civil War, women had 
                                                
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997). 
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1997); accord, see generally 
Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880 (Conn. 2013) (explaining the history behind the 
privilege and the rationale for the absolute immunity afforded attorneys in 
relation to their representation of their clients). See Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 
P.2d 941, 952 (Okla. 1990) (The privilege applies as long as the defamatory 
matter or statements bear some relationship or relevance to the contemplated or 
existing judicial proceeding.). See also Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial 
Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for 
Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 168-
69 (2012) (It is a well-known fact that both men and women, whether in 
heterosexual or homosexual relationships, experience DV as victims and 
offenders. While DV against men is a known issue, the credible social science 
statistics show that women experience DV much more often than men. This 
article focuses on the female DV victim but does not ignore the fact that male DV 
victimization exists as well). 
8 See, e.g., Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making 
about Divorce Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 145, 148 (2003); see generally Donna J. King, Naming the 
Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial 
Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. 
JUST. 153 (2012). 
9  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 59 (2011); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and 
Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (1987); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex 
Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. 
REV. 265, 266 (1984); Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status 
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little, if any, liberty to change their economic, political, and social 
status under the U.S. Constitution or through the American legal 
systems.10 However, once the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution was ratified in 1868, women’s legal opportunities were 
expected to improve because the Amendment includes a clause 
guaranteeing all persons “equal protection of the laws.”11 Yet, its 
spirit – equality of rights for all persons – has been systematically 
denied to women within the patriarchal framework of U.S. 
jurisprudence and social culture, its ratification did effect U.S. 
Supreme Court doctrine regarding its interpretation of the concept 
of liberty. 12  Nevertheless, this new concept of liberty did not 
immediately take effect for women, nor did it provide them the 
rights they believed they gained under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the subsequent ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920. 13  Indeed, during the century following the Amendment’s 
ratification, the common thread among the Supreme Court sex-
discrimination case holdings was the justification that gender-
biased state laws were necessary to protect women, rationalizing 
                                                
Determined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine 
of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 460-61 (2002). 
10 See Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's 
Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 
TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153,161 & n.53 (2012) (explaining the 
masculine ideal of liberty and its effects on women’s opportunities for liberty). 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; accord, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the 
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 958 (2002). 
12 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1937) (explaining that the 
Court had enlarged its judgment of the domain of liberty to include that of mind 
as well as of action); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé 
of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic 
Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 161 & n.53 (2012); 
Wildman, supra note 9 (emphasis added). 
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: 
An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued 
Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 161-62 & n.53 
(2012); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 
1372 (2006).  
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that their main purpose in life was to serve their husbands and 
families in a private, domestic sphere.14 It was not until Reed v. 
Reed that the Supreme Court utilized the Fourteenth Amendment, 
for the first time, to rule that a state law was violative on the basis 
of sex discrimination.15 
 The legal system’s inability to recognize and redress the 
unique harms, including trauma, experienced by women in matters 
concerning DV is particularly pervasive throughout the United 
States. 16  Societal acceptance of male power and control over 
women exposes women to DV in alarmingly high numbers, 
resulting in most DV victims experiencing debilitating trauma.17 
Similarly to defining domestic violence, the field of trauma has 
                                                
14  See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388, 395 (1937) 
(determining that women were in need of “the state’s protective power” when 
upholding legislation that singled out women); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 
419-23 (1908) (justifying Oregon’s discrimination against women, the Court 
explained that “The two sexes differ . . . the self-reliance which enables one to 
assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.”); 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment did not afford protections to women 
for the purposes of employment of engaging in a profession, justifying his 
position by stating that “The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which 
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil 
life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother.”) Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, 
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto 
ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1372 (2006). 
15 See generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)(although the Court utilized 
the standard of review in traditional rational basis terms, the Court determined 
that an Idaho state law was invalid on its face based on the concept of sex 
discrimination). 
16 See Mike Brigner, Why Do Judges Do That?, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, 
AND CHILD CUSTODY 13-5 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010); 
King, supra note 5 at 154. 
17 See, e.g., Amy Kaiser, Carol Strike, & Lorraine E. Ferris, What the Courts 
Need to Know About Mental Health Diagnoses of Abused Women, 19 MED. & L. 
737, 741 (2000); Donna J. King, Naming the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an 
Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial Proceeding for Continued Domestic 
Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 153, 157-58 (2012). See 
generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN 
PERSONAL LIFE (2007).  
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experienced its own difficulties in finding a consensus for one 
holistic working definition for trauma. 18  Indeed, the trauma 
experienced by DV victims is not monolithic in nature; it manifests 
itself in many forms of suffering often compared to that of 
kidnapped persons or prisoners of war.19 The Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration’s (“SAMHSA”) developed 
a concept of trauma for use by caretakers throughout the system 
who provide the support to those affected by trauma as well as the 
communities and stakeholders working to provide a framework of 
trauma-informed support.20  
 The most important avenue of protection and for assistance 
for DV victims is through the U.S. judicial system. However, many 
DV victims frequently find themselves re-victimized by their 
abusers through the court system as well as by the active 
participation of judges, lawyers, and other officers of the court.21 In 
fact, even after an injunction for protection against DV is issued by 
the court to prevent the abuser from having direct physical contact 
with the victim, the parties to the litigation may often face each other 
in open court for a myriad of varying legal reasons.22 In effect, 
because of absolute privilege and gender bias courts, the courthouse 
is a shelter for DV offenders who enter its doors with intentions of 
                                                
18 See David Hirschel & Eve Buzawa, Understanding the Context of Dual Arrest 
with Directions for Future Research, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1449, 1456-
58 (2002); Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
SAMHSA’s Concept of Trauma and Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach, 
7 (July 2014), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA14-
4884.pdf.  
19 See JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: HOPE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING 
4 (2nd ed. 2005); STARK, supra note 17, at 204; King supra note 5, at 156. 
20 See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, SAMHSA’s 
Concept of Trauma and Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach, 7 (July 
2014), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA14-4884.pdf.  
21 See Mike Brigner, Why Do Judges Do That?, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, 
AND CHILD CUSTODY 13-5 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010); 
King, supra note 5, at 153-54. 
22 See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological 
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1310, 1313 (1993). 
DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L. VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 
7 DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.   [Vol. VI: 1 
 
 
re-abusing their victims.23 Thus, the DV victim is prevented from 
holding her abuser liable for any untrue, excessive, or traumatic 
statements committed in relation to litigation.24  
 When a person is disabled and qualifies for protection under 
the Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”), it may require the court 
to make certain modifications to meet accommodations for disabled 
persons, including a DV victim who has been diagnosed with PTSD 
as the result of the abuse she has suffered.25 This article asserts that 
the absolute privilege is one court rule that should be modified 
under the ADA when a DV victim is engaged in litigation with her 
abuser.26 The ADA is a powerful federal statute that instructs states 
and their courts to accommodate or modify their judicial forums for 
the purposes of preventing ongoing discrimination against disabled 
persons, which includes DV victims with PTSD.27 Although much 
has been done to hold offenders of sexual harassment accountable, 
today, there are negligible applicable ADA policies in the DV 
context and fewer scholars calling for substantive change to ADA 
modifications and accommodations for DV victims with PTSD.28 
                                                
23 See Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-4 to -5. 
24 See Casey L. Jernigan, The Absolute Privilege is Not a License to Defame, 23 
J. LEGAL PROF. 359, 360, 362 (1999). See also King supra note 5, at 169 n.106 
(explaining that a DV survivor is revictimized “when her abuser places her ‘on 
trial’. . . . [T]he Fathers’ Rights movement actively encourages it’s [sic] members 
to smear the credibility of the victim both on the stand and in the community” 
(Janet Normalvanbreucher, Stalking Through the Courts, THE LIZ LIBRARY 
(1999), http://www.thelizlibrary.org/site-index/site-index-
frame.html#soulhttp://www.thelizlibrary.org/liz/FRtactic.html)). 
25 See Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All… The Americans with 
Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 125, 130, 133, 137-38 
(1994). 
26 Gould, supra note 25, at 125, 130, 133, 137-38. 
27 Gould, supra note 25, at 125, 130, 133, 137-38. 
28 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Information and 
Technical Assistance on the Americans with Disabilities Act, (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.ada.gov/; LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR 
THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 127-59 (1994) 
(explaining the policy changes regarding sexual harassment and the ADA as well 
as strengthening therapy for those sexual harassment victims suffering from 
PTSD). 
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Furthermore, while piecemeal accommodations may be occurring, 
there is a gap in the scholarship linking DV and absolute privilege.29 
 The purpose of this article is to explore the U.S. civil court 
system and to expose the debilitating trauma that DV victims 
experience within the judicial system when having to face their 
abuser, particularly the trauma caused by absolute privilege, and to 
suggest an avenue for redress. Part II explains the gendered nature 
of law and the difficulties victims of DV face when entering the 
U.S. legal system. Part III discusses domestic violence, trauma, and 
PTSD, specifically focusing on issues pertaining to questioning the 
credibility of female witnesses. Part IV describes the difficulty 
victims of DV experience when leaving their abuser and provides 
specific details as to the trauma and injuries caused by DV, 
especially that of PTSD. Part V explains the DV abuser’s ability to 
manipulate the gender-biased court system and describes how the 
DV victim is re-traumatized during contentious litigation with their 
abuser. Part VI presents the common law doctrine of absolute 
privilege as a weapon for furthering DV within a judicial 
proceeding. Part VII asserts that the ADA mandates that the U.S. 
judicial system has an obligation to modify its policies, specifically 
as to the affirmative defense of absolute privilege, to accommodate 
DV victims with PTSD in litigation whereby the victim’s disability 
prevents the proper administration of justice.  
II.  THE GENDERED NATURE OF LAW: THE MEN’S 
TRIBUNAL  
“The backlash against gender-sensitive responses to  
women’s victimization, offending, and imprisonment is 
inseparable from the broader context of contemporary  
resistance to and reaction against feminism  
and other movements for civil and human rights.”30 
 
                                                
29 See Gould, supra note 25, at 125, 130, 133, 137-38. 
30 Molly Dragiewicz, Patriarchy Reasserted: Fathers’ Rights and Anti-VAWA 
Activism, 3 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 121, 121 (2008).  
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 By its very construct, the law, as a discourse and a practice, 
is traditional and conservative, making it very ridged to new 
concepts, radical thinking, and change.31 Through the process of 
legal precedent, legal language tends to rely on antiquated 
terminology that is grounded in masculine legal thought and 
processes that reflect patriarchal social norms.32 Indeed, the term 
man is considered the genderless norm upon which all other forms 
of identity, including gender and race, must rely.33 However, the 
notion that the law is genderless, with men representing the non-
gender perspective, is not reflective of the gender-biased reality 
most women face on a day-to-day basis throughout the U.S. judicial 
system.34 In the law, the use of the term gender is meant to signify 
the social and cultural construct of women rather than men for which 
legal jurisprudence, regarding sex or gender discrimination, 
identifies as feminine rather than masculine characteristics.35  
Since the U.S. Constitution came into force in 1789, U.S. 
state and federal judiciaries have consistently protected and 
reinforced a male-gendered legal position.36 The U.S. legal system 
is entrenched in male concepts and female stereotypes, causing the 
male experience to be viewed as the only legitimate foundational 
                                                
31 See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of 
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 888-90 
(1989). 
32 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the 
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 890 (1989); 
See Molly Dragiewicz, Patriarchy Reasserted: Fathers’ Rights and Anti-VAWA 
Activism, 3 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 121, 123 (2008). 
33 See Finley, supra note 31 at 887-88. 
34 See, e.g., Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8; See also Erika R. Schwarz, 
When “Neutral” Doesn’t Really Mean “Neutral”: Louisiana’s Child Custody 
Laws—An Attempt to Erase Gender Bias in the Name of Neutrality, 42 LOY. L. 
REV. 365, 365 (1997). 
35  See Molly Dragiewicz, Patriarchy Reasserted: Fathers’ Rights and Anti-
VAWA Activism, 3 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 121, 122 (2008); Lucinda M. Finley, 
Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of 
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 887-88, 890 (1989). 
36  See Erika R. Schwarz, When “Neutral” Doesn’t Really Mean “Neutral”: 
Louisiana’s Child Custody Laws—An Attempt to Erase Gender Bias in the Name 
of Neutrality, 42 LOY. L. REV. 365, 372 (1997). 
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standard upon which legal rights and claims are be based.37 This 
gendered legal perspective creates a fertile breeding ground for 
male-dominated legal decisions, especially in family court where 
DV cases are heard.38 Indeed, the voice of the female DV victim is 
often drowned out by the male-centric legal reasoning and legal 
rhetoric of judges who have the discretion to determine that DV has 
not occurred or is a thing of the past, even in cases with the most 
substantial physical evidence of abuse.39  
A. Domestic Violence Dismissiveness: A Case Study 
 The legal system is inherently male and overtly seeks to 
empower the male norm.40 The reasonable person (man) standard 
utilized throughout the U.S. judicial system and within societal 
norms reflect the male gender standard. 41  Even still, women 
experience discrimination in more subtle ways through male-
gendered power dominance that expects women to assimilate into 
the male norm rather than allowing them to maintain the female-
gendered differential, especially through unwritten social norms 
                                                
37 See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) (In making its decision, 
the court stated that “the gender-based differentiation created by [the statute] that 
results in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes 
producing less protection for their spouses than is produced by the efforts of men 
– is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when supported by no more substantial 
justification than ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations, . . . or ‘old notions,’ . . 
. such as ‘assumptions as to dependency,’ . . . that are more consistent with ‘the 
role-typing society has long imposed,’ . . . than with contemporary reality.”); 
Erika R. Schwarz, When “Neutral” Doesn’t Really Mean “Neutral”: Louisiana’s 
Child Custody Laws—An Attempt to Erase Gender Bias in the Name of 
Neutrality, 42 LOY. L. REV. 365, 373 (1997). 
38 See, e.g., Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8; Schwarz, supra note 36, at 372-
73.  
39 See, e.g., Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8. 
40  See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN 
PERSONAL LIFE 156 (2007); Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and 
the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
352, 355 (1988). 
41 See STARK, supra note 17; Finley supra note 31. 
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and expectations that pervade legal doctrines. 42  Psychologist 
Lenore Walker, who developed the term battered women’s 
syndrome (“BWS”), explains that social battering stems from 
various forms of coercion implemented by the DV abuser, such as 
economic discrimination and social isolation. 43  Indeed, Walker 
asserts that PTSD is the most accurate diagnosis for the 
psychological symptoms of most abused women who seek 
assistance through therapy. However, for those abused women who 
do not meet the criteria for such a formal diagnosis, BWS is 
understood as another model of explanation for the clinical 
symptoms the DV victim suffers. 44  The result of such cross-
diagnosis utilized within the psychological community, crossing 
over into the judicial system, allows for further confusion and 
pervasive bias against the DV victim. Indeed, having to determine 
whether to apply BWS or PTSD prior to a trial for the purposed of 
a DV case, where the judge is already indignant, does not bode well 
for the DV victim. Indeed, throughout the United States and its legal 
system, women, especially those who are victims of DV, are treated 
with disdain, disbelief and dismissiveness, as the case below 
exemplifies.45  
 Susan Rhoades and Reginald Garcia were married in 1978, 
but, following 25 years of violence and sexual assault, Susan finally 
summoned the courage to separate from her husband.46 Her divorce 
proceedings were highly contested and protracted, and the trial court 
found that Susan’s testimony was not correct, including her 
                                                
42 See STARK, supra note 17 (explaining that men are provided the full dignity of 
an adult entitled to a complete set of rights whereby women must prove 
themselves worthy of this same treatment); Finley supra note 31. 
43 See STARK, supra note 17, at 120. 
44 See STARK, supra note 17, at 120; LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN 
AND SURVIVOR THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 369-
70 (1994). 
45 See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological 
and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1309-10 (1993). 
46 See Garcia v. Rhoades, 2012 Cal. Unrep. LEXIS 8837, at *4-7 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1st Dist. Dec. 3, 2012). 
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allegations of DV against her husband.47 Nevertheless, trial court 
testimony shows how Susan’s experiences with DV profoundly 
affected her struggles in the courtroom.48 Although Susan’s expert 
testimony supported her experiences of DV, Susan’s attempts to 
protect herself through the judicial system by her requests for 
protection from her estranged husband, her DV allegations were 
viewed as baseless.49 
 At trial, Susan testified to receiving threatening phone calls 
where she could hear a clip being inserted into a gun and the noise 
of a police scanner in the background.50 After living in constant 
fear, Susan presented as very distressed, tearful, and anxious at her 
first counseling session which were determined to be cluster 
symptoms associated with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
stemming from a traumatic experience in her marriage.51 Still, due 
to Garcia’s expert’s testimony at trial, stating that Susan lacked the 
required major life-threatening traumatic experience for a PTSD 
diagnosis, Susan was found by the trial court to have exaggerated 
her experiences with Garcia.52  Although the trial court record in 
this case contains substantial evidence of Susan’s struggles with DV 
and its effects on her abilities to function, the court did not view the 
evidence as such. Rather, it found that Susan was irresponsible, 
prolonged the proceedings, and was the cause of the costly 
litigation.53 Thus, the court found that Garcia committed no DV 
against Susan.54 
                                                
47 See Id. at *35. 
48 See Id. at *23-29 (at the end of the day of expert testimony on Susan’s mental 
health condition brought on by DV by both Susan’s and Garcia’s experts, the 
court admonished both parties that the case was taking too long, needed to be 
concluded, or would continue into the next calendar year). 
49 See Id. at *43. 
50 Id. at *21. 
51 Id. at *23. 
52 See Garcia v. Rhoades, 2012 Cal. Unrep. LEXIS 8837, at *37 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1st Dist. Dec. 3, 2012). 
53 See Id. at *43. 
54 See Id.  
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B. Preventing Progress: Bradwell v. Illinois 
 American society considers maleness the apex or pinnacle 
of its gendered hierarchy due to the fact that men dominate public 
and private positions of power.55 However, maleness is also the 
foundation, or the bedrock of the American legal system because its 
federal and state laws are based upon the male worldview. 56 
Femaleness is ignored, devalued, and disregarded with impunity by 
the overall gendered structure of American society, which permits 
the law and government to perpetuate the United States’ primary 
patriarchal atmosphere.57 This atmosphere of women’s inferiority 
and male superiority allows DV to perpetuate because violence 
against women is not stigmatized.58 
 Historically, men have maintained the power and ability to 
construct a gendered hierarchy that governs and controls societal 
structures, including government and the law. 59  This gendered 
power continues to support inequality, resulting in the subordination 
and domination of women. 60  It is due to these societal gender 
inequalities that DV abusers feel empowered to deploy their many 
DV tactics upon their victim.61 Without society’s social stigmas 
working against them, abusive men are more enabled to continue 
the cycle of abuse through ongoing power and control structures 
implemented within the home, structures that continue into the law 
and its institutions.62 
                                                
55 Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman 
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1398, 1411-12 (1992). 
56 See Joan Zorza, Batterer Manipulation and Retaliation Compounded by Denial 
and Complicity in the Family Courts, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND 
CHILD CUSTODY 14-11 to 14-12 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 
2010); Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task 
Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1348-49 (1994). 
57 See Id. 
58 See STARK, supra note 17. 
59  See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable 
Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1412 
(1992). 
60 See Id. 
61 See STARK, supra note 17. 
62 See STARK, supra note 17. 
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 The patriarchal atmosphere was classically expressed in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, which 
illustrated its view of female autonomy. 63  With the majority’s 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court used its male-biased 
interpretation to indefinitely deny women their unenumerated 
fundamental rights.64 As long as the Court found it necessary to 
maintain the patriarchal society it cherished, it circumvented the 
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 In his infamous concurring 
opinion in Bradwell, Justice Bradley expressed his strongly held 
viewpoint regarding women and their status within society.66 He 
stated that Mrs. Bradwell “assume[d]” incorrectly that “women as 
citizens” have the right “under the fourteenth amendment of the 
Constitution … to engage in any and every profession, occupation, 
or employment in civil life.”67 Additionally, Justice Bradley stated 
that the “natural and proper timidity and delicacy” of women makes 
them unfit “for many of the occupations of civil life.”68  In his 
conclusion, Justice Bradley stated that it is “[t]he paramount destiny 
and mission of woman [] to fulfill the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother.”69 It is this typical, Court endorsed, stereotype of 
women that perpetuates societal, economic, and gender 
inequalities.70 Truly, Justice Bradley’s comments, in his concurring 
opinion in Bradwell, proclaim the same anti-feminist undertones 
that women, especially DV victims, face today. 
                                                
63 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
64  See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138-39; Donna J. King, The War on Women’s 
Fundamental Rights: Connecting U.S. Supreme Court Originalism to Rightwing, 
Conservative Extremism in American Politics, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 99, 
99 (2012). 
65 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 138-39; King, supra note 64, at 123-24. 
66 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 140-42. 
67 Id. at 140. 
68 Id. at 141. 
69 Id.  
70 See STARK, supra note 17. 
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C. Equality and Feminism 
 The decision and sexist rhetoric within the opinion from 
Bradwell v. Illinois set an overtly damaging precedent for 
“legitimiz[ing] sex discriminat[ion] attitudes and behavior” for well 
over a century.71  The holding in Bradwell, as well as the legal 
analysis employed by the Court, reinforced the concept that “gender 
determines one’s appropriate social role.”72  By legitimizing and 
perpetuating sex discrimination, the Supreme Court maintained and 
fortified the “diminishment of women’s power in society.”73 This 
legal behavior further fuels the oppression and subjugation of 
women within American society, helping to foster the nation’s 
ignorance of and detachment from the issues surrounding the 
perpetration of DV and the many harms it invokes upon its 
victims. 74  Today, these decisions continue to affect women’s 
ability, or lack thereof, to obtain the equal protection of the laws to 
which they are entitled.75 
 The adversarial system, from which our American judicial 
system is based, uses metaphors that parallel individualistic and 
conflict-oriented constructs that portray a system that was “created 
for people for whom conflict is natural or even desirable.”76 Legal 
language, and the use of metaphors in legal language, can alienate 
women and hinder their participation in legal dialogue. 77  The 
framers and users of legal language, i.e. white, educated, privileged 
men, drafted the narrative of the law and the traditional nature of 
metaphors used in legal language so that the law emphasizes 
“masculine ‘patterns of socialization, experience, and values.’”78 
Feminists lament that the use of baseball metaphors, for example, 
                                                
71 Wildman, supra note 9, at 266. 
72 Wildman, supra note 9.  
73 Wildman, supra note 9. 
74 See STARK, supra note 17. 
75 See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 9, at 56-57; King, supra note 5.  
76 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and 
Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 251 (1995). 
77 Adam Arms, Metaphor, Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 
273 (1999). 
78 Arms, supra note 77, at 274. 
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and other sporting rhetoric in legal language represent the very 
essence of patriarchal oppression.79  At present, male and sports 
metaphors used in legal language “do not reflect the presence of 
women in litigation.” 80  The use of sexual metaphors in legal 
language to emphasize the dominance of the legal system by 
heterosexual male sexuality is more subtle than sports and war 
metaphors, but it also emphasizes that the realm of litigation is 
occupied predominantly by men.81 Moreover, if women are unable 
or unwilling to assume male traits in the “specific metaphorical 
structuring of litigation,” women risk devaluation and a relegation 
to perceived non-entities in the legal realm as well as complete 
exclusion from legal dialog. 82  Still, the law is not simply a 
dichotomous interpretation of unambiguous words. The “nature of 
legal reasoning” is predominantly “male defined,” leaving it open 
to gender-biased interpretation, rather than objective legal 
reasoning.83  
 Some feminist legal theorists, including Angela P. Harris, 
suggest that the U.S. gendered hierarchical system does not afford 
women full economic, social, or legal status.84 When explaining 
dominance feminism, Harris describes a gendered system that 
converges with the institutional structures and economic practices 
of American society, essentially threatening women’s individuality 
and vulnerabilities. Indeed, it is foremost women’s autonomy and 
agency that DV abusers understand they must control.85 However, 
the theoretical model of dominance feminism does not argue for 
gender equality. Rather, it advocates abolishing the existing systems 
which are founded on the concept of woman-hating.86 It is these 
                                                
79 Arms, supra note 77, at 274. 
80 Thornburg, supra note 76, at 246. 
81 Arms, supra note 77, at 275 
82 Arms, supra note 77, at 276. 
83 See Finley, supra note 31, at 886.  
84  See Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three 
Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 51 (2009). 
85 See Harris, supra note 84, at 51-52; STARK, supra note 17. 
86 See Harris, supra note 84, at 51. 
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systems that reinforce structural misogynistic attributes within 
American society, making it extraordinarily difficult for the female 
DV victim to find a voice.87 Indeed, these theorists assert that the 
male perspective is the dominant measurement and viewpoint, or 
norm, from which all other legal perspectives are developed. 88 
Harris asserts that the misogynist norm should not be the equality 
standard to which women aspire. Rather women, as well as society 
as a whole, should seek to remove this male legal standard because 
it creates a barrier for all other protected groups of people.89 As a 
result, despite the legal losses that women like Mrs. Bradwell and 
Susan Garcia experience, they must continue to seek equality 
through the legal protections provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.90  Although the Supreme Court attempts to overtly 
deny women their enumerated and unenumerated fundamental 
rights, by determining through the most sexist means that the 
Amendment does not apply to them, it is important that the charge 
for full access to rights and liberties is not abandoned.91  
 
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA, AND POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: QUESTIONING 
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FEMALE WITNESS  
“[W]omen are often disbelieved because they are women.”92 
                                                
87 See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of 
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 888, 892 
(1989). 
88 See Harris, supra note 84, at 51. 
89 See Harris, supra note 84, at 51. 
90 See King, supra note 64, at 125-26. 
91 See Joan Hoff Wilson, The Legal Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries, 6 HUM. RTS. 125, 126 (1977); Donna J. King, Naming 
the Judicial Terrorist: An Exposé of an Abuser's Successful Use of a Judicial 
Proceeding for Continued Domestic Violence, 1 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & SOC. 
JUST. 153, 161 n.53 (2012) (discussing Justice Scalia’s comments and others’ 
viewpoints that women are not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment); 
King, supra note 64, at § IV. 
92  Molly Dragiewicz, Gender Bias in the Courts: Implications for Battered 
Mothers and Their Children, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD 
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 Men’s systemic discrimination against women finds no 
better historical example than the legal doctrine of coverture.93 
Upon marriage, the husband and wife were considered “one person 
in law.”94 Adopted from the common law in England, coverture 
considered married women covered under the legal protection of 
their husbands.95 Once a woman married, coverture severely limited 
her rights to own and control property, including her pre-marital and 
post-marital property, as it immediately transferred to the sole 
control of her husband.96 Through the simple act of marriage, a 
woman was legally subsumed by her husband, making her “civilly 
dead.”97 As coverture lost its foothold and women became stronger 
legally due to the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, divorce 
law evolved concurrently with the changing roles of women 
throughout American society. 98  A basic strain within family 
relationships, fueling to an ever climbing contemporary divorce 
rate, is women’s determination to achieve greater autonomy and 
recognition as an equal partner within the marriage and family.99 
Indeed, divorce was an escape for those whose spouses failed to 
                                                
CUSTODY 5-9 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) (quoting Judith 
Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2205 
(1993)). 
93 Danaya C. Wright, Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes Court Records, 1858-1866, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 903 
n.1 (2004)(“Coverture is a legal doctrine in which a woman’s legal existence is 
subsumed into that of her husband upon marriage. While in a state of coverture—
so long as she remains married—she is unable to own property, control her own 
wages, enter into contracts, make her own will, or be sued.”) 
94 See Zaher, supra note 9, at 460. 
95 See Zaher, supra note 9, at 460 (emphasis added). 
96 See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 
383, 385 (1994). 
97 See Zaher, supra note 9, at 460. 
98 Steven Mintz, Children, Families and the State: American Family Law in 
Historical Perspective, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 647 (1992); See U.S. CONꜱ T. 
amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX 
99  Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical 
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 657 (1984). 
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achieve the higher expectations of this demanding marital 
dynamic.100 
 Domestic Violence has garnered an ever increasing 
awareness in America in recent decades. However, the issue of DV 
is documented throughout history dating back to Ancient Rome.101 
As late as the 1870s in America, husbands and fathers exercising 
their property rights were legally allowed to chastise their wives and 
children, including the use of the rule of thumb.102 Today, although 
the practice of physical chastisement is illegal, society has 
repeatedly turned a blind eye toward dealing with DV and family 
matters in general, resisting interference within the nuclear family 
unit because of our long-standing concern with maintaining 
domestic privacy.103  
The social science term domestic violence, defined by 
Mary Ann Dutton, is: 
 
a pattern of coercive behavior that changes the 
dynamics of an intimate relationship within which it 
occurs. Once the pattern of coercive control is 
established, both parties understand differently the 
meaning of specific actions and words. Domestic 
violence is not simply a list of discrete behaviors, but 
is a pattern of behavior exhibited by the batterer that 
includes words, actions, and gestures, which, taken 
together, establish power and control over an 
intimate partner.104 
                                                
100 See Friedman, supra note 99, at 658. 
101 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 148. 
102 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 148; Williams, supra note 96, at 386 (a 
husband could chastise his wife with a stick as long as it was no larger in diameter 
than that of his thumb). 
103 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8. 
104 Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151 (quoting Mary Ann Dutton, Expert Witness 
Testimony in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, 
ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE § 8-81, § 8-8 (Deborah M. Goelman 
et al. eds., 1996)). 
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Dutton’s definition indicates that DV is part of a larger dynamic 
whereby an abuser uses violence to reinforce domination strategies 
over his victim. 105  However, definitions of DV utilized in the 
practice of law are different from social science definitions.106 The 
law is primarily focused on specific, discrete incident(s) of physical 
abuse, rather than the broader spectrum of abusive conduct that 
encompasses “a cohesive pattern of coercive controls,” which is 
understood to occur by the social science definition.107 The term 
domestic violence, whether used in the broader social science or 
narrower legal context, is often too truncated to properly describe 
an individual’s DV experience. 108  A more individual, abstract 
concept is needed to address the unique experiences of the DV 
victim due to the shortcomings of the one-size-fits-all prevailing 
view of DV.109  
 Abused women may experience a wide variety of near-term 
and long-term impacts from physical, sexual, and emotional DV.110 
Specifically, women can suffer from “clinical depression and 
somatic complaints, anxiety disorders, mental illness, alcohol and 
drug abuse, low self-esteem, and suicidal ideation.” 111  DV 
manifests as the use of power and control by an abuser, who is 
typically male, against an intimate partner, who is typically 
female.112 The use of power and control by an abuser can take many 
forms.113 Physical violence is used in select circumstances and in 
strategic, calculated ways.114 The abuser may seem irrational or 
                                                
105 See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985 (1994-1995). 
106 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151. 
107  Linda E. Offner, Power and Control: Dispelling the Myths Surrounding 
Domestic Violence, 13 NEV. FAM. L. REP., Winter Extra 6, 6 (1998); accord Ver 
Steegh, supra note 8, at 151. 
108 Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 152. 
109 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151. 
110 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 740.  
111 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 740. 
112 See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 15-16; STARK, supra note 17, at 281.  
113 See STARK, supra note 17, at 269-276;  Stark, supra note 105, at  983-84. 
114 See Stark, supra note 105, at 986. 
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unpredictable in order to maintain a sense of insecurity and fear in 
his victim.115 Verbal, emotional, and economic threats are other 
tactics employed by many DV abusers.116 However, many abused 
women, especially those who do not experience physical violence 
from their abuser, may not even realize they are victims of DV.117 
Thus, they do not self-identify as a victim or seek outside assistance 
to remedy their situation.118 As a result, millions of women are 
unwittingly subjected to ongoing DV every day, living under the 
torment and control of their abusers.119 
 On June 26, 1987, the United Nations Human Rights Office 
of the High Commissioner entered into force its Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.120 The Convention against Torture defines torture as:  
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a  confession, punishing 
him for an act her or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.121 
                                                
115 See STARK, supra note 17, at 281. 
116 See King, supra note 5, at 156. 
117 See, e.g., King, supra note 5; STARK, supra note 17, at 157-158. 
118 See King, supra note 5, at 154-55, 157. 
119 See King, supra note 5, at 154-55, 157. 
120  See generally Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf [hereinafter 
Convention against Torture]. 
121 Convention against Torture, supra note 273, at art. I, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1984), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf. 
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Indeed, this comprehensive definition, ascribed to the United 
Nations, encompasses the forms of torture tolerated by the U.S. 
judicial system as discussed in this article. DV, whether 
implemented through physical violence or through non-physical 
forms of abuse, is a form of torture that continues against its victim, 
is ongoing, and extends over a period of time. 122  The torture 
experienced by DV victims, especially through the US judicial 
system, the trauma these victims manifest, and the symptomology 
they evidence helps to explain the correlation between gender bias 
in the U.S. judicial system and DV.123 The prevalence of PTSD 
among DV victims, who must interact within the U.S. judicial 
system, is alarming, especially considering the ones who are not 
properly diagnosed, treated, or accommodated.124 
 With torture, comes trauma. Trauma is the reaction by a 
person to an event or series of events that are shocking to the person 
and are emotionally and psychologically injurious.125 When one 
experiences a horrible event, they experience trauma.126 Trauma is 
“a violently produced wound [that has] an emotional shock with a 
lasting effect.”127 Exposure to a traumatic event, such as violence 
and abuse, alters the way a DV victim views herself, her friends and 
family, and her environment.128 DV victims who experience trauma 
may develop hyper-vigilance in reaction to perceptions of their 
vulnerability or lack of safety. Victims may experience a sense that 
the violence and abuse from their partner will reoccur or intensify. 
                                                
122 See King, supra note 5, at 157-58.  
123 See King, supra note 5, at 153-54. 
124 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1312-14.  
125 See JON G. ALLEN, COPING WITH TRAUMA: HOPE THROUGH UNDERSTANDING 
5-16 (2nd ed. 2005). 
126  Anne E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: 
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 605 (2003). 
127 See ALLEN, supra note 19. 
128  See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic 
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1191, 1218 (1993). 
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Often, batterers employ a steady barrage of psychological abuse 
between episodes of violence, including; “coercion and threats; 
intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; minimization, denial, and 
blaming; use of the children to control the victim; use of ‘male 
privilege;’ and economic/resource abuse[; and stalking] may 
incorporate several of these categories of psychological abuse.”129  
 SAMHSA’s concept of trauma is explained as “[i]ndividual 
trauma result[ing] from an event, series of events, or set of 
circumstances that is experienced by an individual as physically or 
emotionally harmful or life threatening and that has lasting adverse 
effects on the individual’s functioning and mental, physical, social, 
emotional, or spiritual well-being.”130 This concept of trauma is 
instructive for a court of law in regards to DV victims who have to 
face their abusers in open court. 131  In many cases, the trauma 
experienced by DV victims harms them both physically and 
mentally, even when no physical abuse has occurred or is evident.132 
Nevertheless, most DV definitions focus on physical abuse as the 
standard bearer for the court to be able to issue an order for 
protection against an abuser.133 As Webster’s Dictionary suggests, 
such traumatizing DV often “causes psychological pain or 
discomfort and may be very disabling . . . includ[ing manifestations 
of] anxiety, compulsions, phobias, and depression” as well as 
psychological injuries such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD).134  
 PTSD has been included in both the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (“DSM”) and the 
International Classification of Diseases.135   The DSM-IV, dated 
                                                
129 Id. at 1206.  
130  See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
SAMHSA’s Concept of Trauma and Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach, 
7 (July 2014), http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA14-
4884.pdf. 
131 See id. 
132 See, e.g., STARK, supra note 17; King, supra note 5. 
133 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 151-52. 
134  See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 969 (edition year); 
accord Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17. 
135 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741. 
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1994, states that PTSD can occur when: “(1) the person experienced 
an event that involved actual or threatened death or a threat to the 
physical integrity of self and; (2) the person’s response involved 
intense fear, helplessness or horror.” 136   However, the DSM-5 
differs significantly from the DSM-IV in its recognition and 
description of major symptoms and diagnostic criteria of and for 
PTSD. 137  For example, the DSM-IV states that PTSD is “a 
condition that may ensue when a person has been exposed to a 
traumatic event.”138 But, the DSM-5 “is more explicit with regard 
to how an individual experienced ‘traumatic’ events.”139 Indeed, 
exposure to DV is certainly a traumatic event, causing between 33% 
and 62% of DV victims to be diagnosed with PTSD.140  
 DV cannot simply be boxed into isolated, singular events of 
physical violence. 141  The trauma endured during the daily life 
course of an abused woman can be more damaging and difficult to 
recover from than the worst forms of physical violence.142  It is 
because of this type of invisible torment that many women feel “a 
formal psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD validates [their] claim of 
                                                
136 Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741-42; accord Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, https://justines2010blog.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/dsm-iv.pdf. 
137 See Highlights of Changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%2520Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA
_DSM_Changes_from_DSM-IV-TR_-to_DSM-
5.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.; see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, DSM-5, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
https://psicovalero.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/dsm-v-ingles-manual-
diagnc3b3stico-y-estadc3adstico-de-los-trastornos-mentales.pdf.  
138 Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741. 
139 See Highlights of Changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%2520Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA
_DSM_Changes_from_DSM-IV-TR_-to_DSM-
5.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
140 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 742. 
141 See Dutton, supra note 128, at 1208. 
142 See, e.g., Id. 
DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L. VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 
25 DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.   [Vol. VI: 1 
 
 
exposure to severe trauma.”143 The continuous levels of stress and 
fear, as well as feelings of disempowerment and lack of control 
evoked by their abuser, is comparable to the torture experienced by 
prisoners of war.144 The trauma from DV experienced by victims, 
which can ultimately lead to PTSD, is part of a much “larger pattern 
of dominance and control,” beyond merely the physical 
aggression.145  
 A DV victim with PTSD “may experience delusions or 
hallucinations, high levels of distractibility, decreased personal 
hygiene, social isolation or withdrawal, strange behavior, 
confusion, anxiety, poor insight and judgement, and impaired 
interpersonal relations.”146 Due to her PTSD injury, she may have 
challenges with “maintaining stamina, managing time pressure, 
focusing on multiple tasks, or responding to negative comments.”147 
Additionally, a DV victim with PTSD may be receiving treatment 
for her condition with psychotropic medications, which are intended 
to provide beneficial changes to her cognitive function. These 
medications, however, can have some negative side effects. 148 
These side effects can include: “acute dystonia (severe involuntary 
spasms of the upper body, tongue, throat, or eyes), akathisia (motor 
restlessness and inability to sit still) . . . and tardive dyskinesia (a 
generally irreversible neurological disorder characterized by 
involuntary uncontrollable muscular movements often in the facial 
area).”149 A DV victim with PTSD who displays these negative 
effects from her medication can affect the perceptions formed by a 
judge or jury related to her competence or even sanity.150 Litigants 
with psychiatric disabilities, like PTSD, “are significantly less 
likely than their counterparts with non-psychiatric disabilities to 
                                                
143  Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman 
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 999 (1995). 
144 See King, supra note 5, at 156. 
145 Meier, supra note 22, at 1317. 
146 Gould, supra note 25, at 147-48. 
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148 Gould, supra note 25, at 147-48. 
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receive a beneficial outcome.” 151  People with PTSD were 
“significantly less likely than people with other disabilities to feel 
that they had a chance to tell their stories, that they were treated with 
dignity, or that decisionmakers were fair.”152 
 Women, who may be trapped in a “cycle of violence,” can 
develop PTSD from emotional, sexual, and/or physical abuse.153 
Studies show that a diagnosis of PTSD for an abused woman 
suggests that the disorder is the “causative effect of the abuse.”154 
Although PTSD was initially used to explain the impact on war 
veterans who were exposed to traumatic events in combat, 
symptoms associated with PTSD in veterans have also been found 
to be common among women who are victims of DV.155 Women 
who are victims of DV may experience a “state of siege,” whereby 
the abuser continues to batter the victim with psychological abuse 
during times of non-physical violence episodes, while the victim 
lives with the varying levels of psychological abuse not knowing 
when the next incident of physical violence will occur.156 They may 
experience a sense of low self-esteem and even blame themselves 
for the violence and abuse as a result of trauma. DV victims may 
find trusting others difficult or impossible due to the traumatic 
experience of verbal and physical violence.157 Victims of DV who 
experience trauma may also struggle with reoccurring central 
nervous system issues whose symptoms include headaches, back 
pain, fainting, or seizures.158 DV victims may also show symptoms, 
signs, and disorders associated with chronic fear and stress like 
gastrointestinal disorders, appetite loss, viral infections, and cardiac 
                                                
151 See Jeffrey Swanson, et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement 
System Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REV. 94, 
117 (2006-2007). 
152 Id. at 119. 
153 Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 153. 
154 Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741. 
155 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1312. 
156 Dutton, supra note 128, at 1208. 
157 See Id. at 1218-19. 
158 See Jacquelyn Campbell et at., Intimate Partner Violence and Physical Health 
Consequences, 162 ARCH INTERN MED. 1157, 1158 (2002). 
DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L. VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 
27 DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.   [Vol. VI: 1 
 
 
issues including hypertension and chest pain. 159  Finally, it is 
important to remember that not all victims of DV or trauma cross 
the threshold for a PTSD diagnosis. However, the absence of a 
PTSD diagnosis should never be considered as evidence that DV is 
not present in an intimate relationship.160  
IV. CHALLENGES TO LEAVING THE ABUSER: 
PATRIARCHAL BARRIERS 
 The barriers to resources that assist DV victims in leaving 
their abuser can be social, psychological, and legal.161 Although 
difficult, DV victims may sometimes be able to escape their abusers 
through, among other options, assistance from mental health 
counselors, victim advocates, religious leaders, and interventions 
from family and friends.162 Support systems are a crucial element to 
a DV victim’s successful separation from DV abusers. 163  DV 
abusers often target a victim’s core support factors, such as “food, 
money, friendships, personal appearance, relationships with 
children, [and] extended family.” 164  Without core support, DV 
victims become dependent on the abuser for basic needs. DV 
abusers also benefit from structural inequalities within our society. 
Inadequate or incompetent social sources of assistance help to 
strengthen the DV abuser’s control over his victim. When police fail 
to arrest the abuser, when medical physicians fail to inquire about 
abuse, and when child protective services remove the child from the 
mother instead of providing assistance with helping the mother keep 
her and the child safe, the failure to intervene by sources of public 
assistance help strengthen the DV abuser’s power and control over 
his victim.165  
                                                
159 See Id. 
160 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 742. 
161 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1318. 
162  See Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: 
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 574, 577, 615, 622 (2003). 
163 See Id.  
164 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1319. 
165 See Id.  
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A. The DV Victim: Barriers in the Court System 
 DV victims and their abusers often end up tangled in the 
civil (and criminal) legal system(s).166 Legal matters involving DV 
victims seeking relief – including injunctions, petitions for orders 
for protection, and divorce – can accelerate violence during and 
following court actions.167 But even as DV victims look to legal 
institutions for help, they often find themselves mired in a system 
that reinforces the power imbalance they faced throughout their 
abusive intimate partner relationship.168 DV abusers often use the 
judicial process to continue to abuse their victims.169 DV abusers 
can employ a variety of successful maneuvers in court in which the 
abuser 
project[s] a non-abusive image, using new partners 
as character references, using the [DV victim’s] 
anger or mistrust to discredit her, making false or 
exaggerated defensive accusations against the [DV 
victim], presenting themselves as the parties who are 
willing to communicate, . . . “it is common for 
[abusers] to be skillfully dishonest.”170 
 
Even if a civil judge admits that DV occurred, many times they will 
focus on a specific incident of physical violence, trivialize the 
severity of the abuse and, often, ignore the emotional and economic 
effects placed upon the DV victim which can be more profound, 
severe, and extensive than the DV itself.171 Adding to the pressure 
DV victims face in court, those who are in divorce proceedings are 
“routinely denied protection [from domestic violence] on the 
                                                
166 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 159, 181.  
167 See Freedman, supra note 126, at 575. 
168 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 161-63.  
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171 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1318.  
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suspicion that their requests for protection are manipulative 
tactics.”172 
 The impact on women who endure DV should be of 
significance to a court of law. 173  PTSD, BWS, and other 
psychological disorders have been used effectively to legitimize the 
impact of abuse on women, but, they are also used to undermine the 
DV victim’s credibility in court, especially when there is no 
confirmed diagnosis.174 Women, who suffer from PTSD, can have 
symptoms from their disorder that negatively impact them in 
litigation situations. 175  PTSD can have a subtle presentation in 
victims, which may lead to a lack of consistent rulings from 
courts.176 PTSD often causes victims to react with “hyperarousal,” 
in which they feel irritable and on guard; “intrusion,” in which they 
re-experience painful memories; and “constriction,” in which they 
feel a diminished ability to experience emotion or whereby they 
experience a feeling of detachment from a given situation.177 Thus, 
having to testify in court in judicial proceedings related to their 
abuser exacerbates these symptoms, causing the DV victim to re-
experience the trauma that caused the PTSD or causing the DV 
victim to completely dissociate during a hearing or trial to protect 
herself from the reoccurrence of the trauma that triggers the 
PTSD.178  
B. The DV Victim: PTSD as a Stigma  
 The DV victim’s potential reactions in litigation settings as 
discussed above may cause a court to question “the woman’s 
demeanor and interaction with people and events, and thereby affect 
her credibility.” 179   Manifestations of PTSD may appear as 
                                                
172 Freedman, supra note 126, at 584. 
173 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 740. 
174 See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9; Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra 
note 17, at 741. 
175 See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9. 
176 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 743. 
177 Meier, supra note 22.  
178 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1328-29.  
179 Id. at 1313. 
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“‘dissociation’” in which a DV victim dissociates herself from her 
body in order to protect herself from the onslaught of triggering 
events that cause the original trauma that caused the PTSD to 
emerge. When dissociation occurs, the DV victim becomes numb 
and may appear “plastic” or “fake” when describing her abuse, 
exhibiting a preoccupied demeanor that a judge or jury would not 
expect. 180  She may experience “hyperarousal” and become 
extremely excited in reaction to a minor event like an insult or a 
look from her abuser in court. 181  The presence of DV can 
profoundly alter how a DV victim fares in court.182 When these 
diagnoses are utilized properly in an effort to explain the victim’s 
seemingly irrational behavior, whether in or out of court, a woman, 
who would otherwise seem non-credible, instead, has an advocate 
who is able to advance her DV experience and injuries.183 But, when 
they are not utilized appropriately or DV victims do not have 
adequate legal counsel, the result can be dramatically unfair.184 
 DV abusers can wreak psychological and legal havoc during 
and following divorce proceedings.185 Abusers can use the judicial 
process as a way to continue the verbal and economic abuse of their 
victims to maintain their power and control over her.186 Judges in 
family court matters typically must attempt to sift through the facts 
presented through a distorted lens of contentious and, often, very 
complex adversarial litigation.187 Some of these adversarial cases 
involve intense conflicts regarding the custody of the children 
                                                
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182  See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 738; Lois Schwaeber, 
Recognizing Domestic Violence: How to Know It When You See It and How to 
Provide Appropriate Representation, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND 
CHILD CUSTODY 2-22 to 2-25 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 
2010). 
183 See Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 741 (PTSD is a brain injury, 
rather than a mental illness). 
184 See Schwaeber, supra note 182. 
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where it is necessary for the court to determine the best interests of 
the child in a family where DV is present.188 In custody matters, 
victims who suffer from PTSD will most likely have their 
psychological injuries from DV used against them by lawyers, 
expert witnesses, and judges because of the legal system’s myopic 
bias against women’s autonomy and reliability.189  
 Courts have used symptomology stemming from PTSD as a 
catalyst to find that a mother is unfit as a parent, subsequently 
awarding custody to the abuser.190 Although relatively rare, some 
courts have awarded custody to “fathers who killed the childrens’ 
[sic] mother, on the ground that the violence against the childrens’ 
[sic] mother was not directed toward the children and did not 
indicate the father would be a poor parent.”191 As repugnant to legal 
fairness as this extreme example may seem, it is an indication of the 
dismissive attitude courts often reveal toward DV victims and the 
actions of their abusers.192 It is very common for courts to hold the 
abuse of the children by the abuser against the protective parent 
where neglect or abuse are at issue, especially in cases where the 
protective parent is a victim of abuse by the abuser as well.193 It is 
widely recognized that children are harmed by witnessing the abuse 
of a parent by the other parent.194 However, evidence of the children 
witnessing the abuse will often be held against the mother for 
exposing the children to the violence, including possible criminal 
sanctions and even termination of parental rights.195 
 Even more so than women generally, DV victims enter the 
adversarial court system at a clear disadvantage.196 The foundation 
                                                
188 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 161. 
189 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1306.  
190 See Id.  
191 See Meier, supra note 22, at 1308. 
192  See Karen Anderson, Courageous Kids: Abused Children Sharing Their 
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of fairness that makes up the American adversarial court system is 
primarily based upon a concept that the parties will enter the court 
with professional representation (attorneys) and that the finder of 
fact (the judge) will determine the truth through a process whereby 
relevant information will be brought forth through the attorneys’ 
best efforts to bring forward their clients’ best positions, therefore 
leading ultimately to a just and fair decision from the court.197 
However, in order to realize this ideal, the American adversarial 
court system presumes that the parties to the litigation will have an 
equal balance of economic resources and access to competent legal 
representation. 198  This balance is rarely, if ever, achieved, 
especially in cases involving DV in which the abusers will often 
“use the court system as a forum to harass and intimidate the abuse 
survivor by engaging in traumatic and expensive ongoing 
litigation.”199 Without an economic equal balance, the adversarial 
model is ill-equipped to compensate for any imbalance of power or 
resources.200 
 Family courts encourage negotiation and will order 
mediation in an effort to lead to private settlements. It is, however, 
dangerous for DV victims to mediate with their abusers. 201 
Avoiding public judicial proceedings to adjudicate issues between 
intimate partners is a high priority for practical and ideological 
rationales; yet, courts do not understand the inequity of power 
between a DV victim and her abuser. 202  This powerful anti-
litigation bias is motivated from historical ideals about family 
autonomy and privacy, and places the DV victim in a vulnerable 
position and at a disadvantage, where she will be unable to negotiate 
                                                
197 See Id. at 161. 
198 See Id.  
199 Id. at 161-62.  
200 See Id. at 161. 
201  See Joan Zorza, Child Custody Practices of the Family Courts in Cases 
Involving Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD 
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DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L. VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 
33 DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.   [Vol. VI: 1 
 
 
for her and her children’s best interests.203 Litigants, who reject the 
anti-litigation bias and choose to litigate, risk being labeled as 
foolhardy, unreasonable, or mentally unstable.204 The litigants who 
receive such labels may be determined as such through the lens of 
gender bias as well as anti-litigation bias when, in fact, the litigant 
is clearly asserting her legal right to fight for her liberty, children’s 
safety, and property.205 
C. PTSD and DV: A Barrier to Leaving the DV 
Abuser 
 There are many reasons a DV victim might decide to leave 
her abuser, but there are also many reasons she may be forced to 
stay, especially when a diagnosis of PTSD for the DV victim is 
involved.206  The adversarial litigation model lacks a capacity to 
properly recognize the emotional and psychological issues between 
the DV victim and her abuser, placing too much emphasis on the 
role of the civil court judge who is typically inadequately trained in 
these areas. 207  Under the adversarial model, litigants and their 
attorneys prepare for an impending trial even though a majority of 
dissolution matters are settled.208 Trial preparation places the parties 
at odds with each other and places them into a win-lose mentality, 
creating differences that are accentuated and common interests, 
which are minimized.209 Attorneys are primarily pressed into roles 
as advocates rather than problem solvers. 210  Consequently, the 
marital dissolution process becomes unnecessarily hostile and 
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confrontational.211 All these drawbacks to the adversarial model in 
family law matters involving DV have “the potential to exacerbate 
[an] already dangerous conflict.”212 
 DV victims have other hurdles to jump over within a court 
process. Even if adequate representation is secured, DV victims 
must provide assistance with evidence.213 They must also balance 
pressures to face “humiliating events that they previously tried to 
keep private.”214 The court setting can be a contentious arena for 
DV victims who suffer from PTSD. In many circumstances, victims 
will be subjected to intimidating cross-examination and may also 
experience hostile reactions from judges in the course of 
hearings.215 Even if judges acknowledge that DV has taken place, 
all too often they devalue the significance of the violence and ignore 
the controlling behavior of the abuser when deciding disputes and 
crafting orders. 216  Also, they often erroneously assume that, 
because the parties are in court, the victim has completely escaped 
the abuse.217 
 DV victims who are suffering from PTSD, find it especially 
challenging to conduct legal actions because, as a result of their 
condition, they “may have difficulty standing up for themselves.”218 
Indeed, it is crucial that a DV survivor with PTSD finds an 
affordable attorney who screens for and understands DV.219 Studies 
show that most litigants are typically “unrepresented because they 
cannot afford to hire an attorney.”220  Indeed, women, including 
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those who are DV victims, are “less likely to be represented than 
men.”221 DV victims are at an even more disadvantaged position if 
their abuser has an attorney and the victim  does not.222 In this 
scenario, the DV victim is without a spokesperson and advocate and 
the abuser’s attorney will most likely have “more access to financial 
and other case related information.”223  
 DV victims are particularly likely to have their claims of 
domestic violence minimized or dismissed outright due to a 
prevailing view that the DV claim is “either [a] product of an 
overreaction” to normal conflict within a marital dissolution, or, 
worse, viewed by the court “as a manipulative tactic to gain an 
unfair advantage.” 224  These barriers make the acquisition of a 
quality, trained attorney a crucial piece to the litigation puzzle for 
DV victims. Locating a quality attorney trained in domestic 
violence abuse and coercive control tactics is the initial hurdle, 
affording a properly qualified attorney is another matter entirely.225 
DV victims, who are fortunate enough to find and retain the best, 
most qualified attorney, still enter the legal system faced with 
gender-biased courts that “continue to treat claims of domestic 
violence with disdain, disbelief and dismissiveness.”226 Adding to 
the hostile adversarial legal environment is the DV abuser who can 
harass the DV victim with false accusations, intimidating his victim 
into defending the falsely claimed deficiencies in trial.227  
 DV abusers can use the psychological stress by  repeatedly 
using  court pleadings as a tactic to wear down DV victims.228 
Stressors that push DV victims to prematurely settle viable cases 
include the discovery and exposure of humiliating events that 
victims attempt to keep private, intimidating and embarrassing 
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depositions and cross-examinations, and overtly hostile judges.229 
Additionally, DV victims may feel a mounting pressure to settle 
prematurely, or to compromise with an abuser to their detriment, all 
the while believing that the abuse would cease if they were to 
capitulate with their abuser.230  If the DV victim is coerced into 
ending the litigation prematurely, accepts a harmful and unjust 
result, or withdraws her case due to re-victimization at the hands of 
her abuser because of absolute privilege, the civil legal system is no 
more than a charade and a sham, instituted to reward the abuser for 
the harms inflicted against his victim.231 
V. ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE: THE COMMON LAW 
DOCTRINE OF CONTINUED DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE  
“‘[C]ourts rarely find lawyers’ statements irrelevant.’”232 
DV abuse does not always find its way to the courthouse 
steps. Of those cases that do, DV abusers are able to use the court’s 
judicial proceedings to continue the abuse through “intimidation, 
isolation, and control under the guise of litigation strategies.”233 
Abusers may gain access to their victims by repeatedly calling them 
into court, exposing them to embarrassing questions in depositions, 
and wearing them down with repetitive false accusations in court 
pleadings. Due to the common law doctrine of absolute privilege, 
abusers and their attorneys are immune from civil liability for 
making false and defamatory statements about DV victims in a 
judicial proceeding.234 Indeed, DV abusers can use the adversarial 
legal system to degrade and threaten their victims without any fear 
of civil consequences.235  
                                                
229 See Freedman, supra note 126, at 598. 
230 See Ver Steegh, supra note 8, at 184-85. 
231 See Schwaeber, supra note 182, at 2-22 to 2-25. 
232  T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for 
Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 934 (2004). 
233 King, supra note 5, at 167. 
234 See generally Casey L. Jernigan, The Absolute Privilege is Not a License to 
Defame, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 359 (1999). 
235 See King, supra note 5, at 169. 
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 This article asserts that DV abusers can take advantage of 
the absolute privilege in litigation, use the privilege to continue their 
abuse of their victims within the civil legal system, and that this 
behavior leads to additional harm for DV victims. Indeed, for 
centuries, the absolute privilege has provided litigants, judges, and 
attorneys with absolute immunity from civil law suits for 
defamation, either in the form of the written or spoken word.  Courts 
have ruled that litigants, in an effort to seek the discovery of 
evidence, may resort to ingenious methods to obtain the needed 
relevant evidence.236 Examples of these ingenious methods include 
tactics such as publishing defamatory statements, utilizing 
threatening language in court documents, and intimidating the 
opposing party through harassing communications that include 
gratuitous verbal abuse or name calling.237 As a result, an abuser 
may understand that he can legally utilize the absolute privilege as 
an affirmative defense to justify his offensive and abusive actions 
against his DV victim during the course of a dissolution of marriage 
or any other judicial proceeding with her.238  
 Absolute privilege allows a DV abuser to continue to 
traumatize his victim indefinitely through judicial proceedings, 
which could often lead to further legal and health related injuries for 
women who are suffering from PTSD due to DV.239 The DV abuser, 
and his attorney, knows he has absolute privilege on his side during 
the course of litigation and will use it to his advantage to continue 
to maintain the power and control he has over his victim and to seek 
unjust benefits in the litigation. 240  The utilization of absolute 
privilege by a DV abuser against his victim is especially likely in 
states where absolute privilege has been expanded beyond its 
common law form. The expansion of absolute privilege essentially 
gives DV abusers a legal license to re-victimize the very people the 
court system is trying to protect. Indeed, the trauma experienced by 
                                                
236 See Kirschstein v. Haynes, 778 P.2d. 941, 951 (Okla. 1990). 
237 See Id.; King, supra note 5, at 168-69. 
238 King, supra note 5, at 168-69; See LatAm Inv., LLC v. Holland & Knight, 
LLP, 88 So. 3d 240, 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
239 See Allen, supra note 19. 
240 See Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-3 to -8; King, supra note 5, at 168-69. 
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a DV victim may often lead to injuries including PTSD, a 
recognized disability entitled to protection under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.241 Specifically, Title II of the ADA requires 
public entities to reasonably modify their rules, policies, practices, 
or services to accommodate the individual with a disability, such as 
PTSD, so that discrimination thereto is prevented. 242  Such 
reasonable modifications by public entities are necessary for people 
with disabilities to fully exercise their legal rights.243  
 The absolute privilege was initially used to protect accusers 
who alleged criminal acts from being sued for defamation, or 
through an action for “‘scandalum magnatum,’ or slander,” brought 
by the accused.244 However, the once narrow privilege articulated 
in an English court in 1497, later adopted in colonial American 
common law, has been expanded in modern jurisprudence to 
include any and all conduct by litigation parties and attorneys.245 
Indeed, the focus on defamatory words involved in litigation has 
broadened to include acts that, otherwise, would constitute tortious 
acts had they not been committed in some form or fashion in a 
judicial proceeding.246 In fact, to utilize the affirmative defense of 
absolute privilege, one may simply claim that the statements or acts 
arose with only the barest of rational relevancy to the litigation with 
which the statements or acts are connected.247  
 Absolute privilege has been expanded to apply to any 
statements or conduct occurring in connection with litigation, such 
as preparing expert witnesses for testimony and communications 
thereto, communications and actions related to settlement 
                                                
241 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12131-
12132 (amended 2008). See also Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra note 17, at 742. 
242 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12131-32; See also Kaiser, Strike, & Ferris, supra 
note 17. 
243 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12131-32. 
244 Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 885 (Conn. 2013). 
245 Simms, 69 A.3d at 885. See generally Levin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 
So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994). 
246 See generally Levin, 639 So. 2d. 606 (Fla. 1994). 
247 See T. Leigh Aneson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for 
Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 933 (2004). 
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agreements, as well as failure to properly maintain a client’s 
confidential information.248 The application of absolute privilege by 
courts is grounded in public policy and is “essential to the need for 
unencumbered administration of justice.” 249  Whether absolute 
privilege applies in a given situation is a matter of law to be 
determined by the trial court.250 The ability for a court to determine 
whether the affirmative defense of absolute privilege applies to a 
person, whom the privilege is meant to protect, “allows courts to 
dismiss cases . . . at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.”251 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,  
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish 
defamatory matter concerning another in 
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial 
proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the 
course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in 
which he participates as counsel, if it has some 
relation to the proceeding.252 
The courts have the responsibility to monitor the privilege by 
regulating the actions of litigants and attorneys under its duty to 
“protect the public, the [legal] profession, and the administration of 
justice.” 253  However, such regulation is typically carried out 
through the courts’ internal sanctions within the litigation or 
through disciplinary proceedings against an officer of the court, i.e. 
an attorney, rather than having another court allow a party to the 
litigation to file a separate legal action against the opposing party or 
attorneys.254 One of the purposes of absolute privilege is to limit the 
liability and to protect attorneys for their actions during the course 
of representation of a party to litigation.255 
                                                
248 See generally Aneson, supra note 248. 
249 Jernigan, supra note 24, at 360. 
250 Aneson, supra note 248, at 918. 
251 See Aneson, supra note 248, at 921 
252 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977). 
253 Jernigan, supra note 24, at 366. 
254 See Aneson, supra note 248, at 925. 
255 See Id. at 916. 
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 The absolute privilege was initially envisioned to “protect 
litigants, witnesses, attorneys, and judges” from frivolous suits 
brought as retribution or to gain an advantage in associated 
litigation; but judicial discretion is the only real constraint on what 
may become abusive, unfair, and defamatory actions.256 Use of the 
absolute privilege was meant to safeguard the adversarial legal 
system from disruptions to the litigation process.257 By providing 
protection from liability, absolute privilege allows litigants, their 
attorneys, and all other participants to perform their respective 
judiciary functions without interference from tort claims brought by 
defamed parties. 258  Defamatory statements made by litigants or 
attorneys that are irrelevant to the judicial proceedings may not be 
protected by the absolute privilege. However, the relevancy of 
defamatory statements are determined by the court as a question of 
law.259 If there are any doubts as to the relevance of an attorney’s 
defamatory statements, the benefit of the doubts are resolved in 
favor of the attorney who made the statements.260  Consequently, 
the privilege removes the possibility of a successful claim by a 
defamed party against an attorney for civil liability. In practice, 
however, the privilege protects litigators and provides “them with a 
license to lie, cheat, or steal” because they know they are immune 
from liability for their statements and actions within the confines of 
a judicial proceeding.261  
 Historically, courts have applied a liberal construction of 
absolute privilege which has become so broad that it has virtually 
no constraint at all. Attorneys who have been found to have made 
“false misrepresentations, manufactur[ed] evidence, and 
present[ed] perjured testimony” have been ruled to be immune from 
lawsuits for their actions. 262  Attorneys are afforded absolute 
                                                
256 See King, supra note 5, at 169. 
257 See Aneson, supra note 248, at 921. 
258 See Aneson, supra note 248, at 921.  
259 See Jernigan, supra note 24, at 361. 
260 See Aneson, supra note 248.  
261 Aneson, supra note 248, at 924. 
262 Aneson, supra note 248, at 938. 
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privilege for defamatory statements that are made in the course of, 
or simply related to, a judicial proceeding.263 Absolute privilege 
“applies regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on 
the part of the lawyer so long as the conduct complained of has some 
relation to the litigation.”264 When a litigant or his attorney invokes 
the absolute privilege as an affirmative defense in a law suit brought 
against him for defamation or tortious acts, “it is irrelevant whether 
the defamatory material is true or false, and it is further irrelevant 
whether the individual making the defamatory statement knew such 
information was false.”265 Generally, any egregious behavior by an 
attorney needing reprimand is handled by the court through 
sanctions or by the state bar association through formal disciplinary 
proceedings rather than by limiting the privilege.266 
 The expansion of the application of absolute privilege 
throughout the U.S. judicial system can result in significant harm to 
the party upon which the defamatory statements and tortious acts 
are directed. 267  Indeed, for anyone who is the victim of such, 
otherwise, actionable offenses, it violates the very concept of 
fairness and justice.268 Certainly, when a judge or jury bases the 
outcome of a case on malicious falsehoods and witnesses or parties, 
                                                
263 See Jernigan, supra note 24, at 371. 
264 Aneson, supra note 248, at 918. 
265 Jernigan, supra note 24, at 360. 
266 See Aneson, supra note 248, at 925. See generally Levin, et al., 639 So. 2d. 
606 (explains that absolute privilege is a powerful doctrine that shields litigants 
and their attorneys from civil liability despite malice by the actor or tremendous 
harm to the victim. Levin expanded the absolute privilege to apply to any cause 
of action that includes words as well as actions inside and outside the courtroom. 
The Florida Supreme Court extended absolute privilege in Florida beyond its 
historically defined limits and set up a circumstance whereby the Florida Supreme 
Court implicitly condones unethical and abusive litigation conduct by attorneys 
and others. Indeed, the Florida courts, as well as many other states such as 
California, Indiana, and New Jersey recognize that absolute privilege applies to 
both statements and acts, a broad interpretation that was not originally 
contemplated by the common law doctrine. It also applies to cases arising from 
statutory law as well as common law, with both federal and state courts following 
this expansive application of the affirmative defense.). 
267 Keith Clausen, Case Comment, Levin v. United States Fire Ins., Co., 639 So. 
2d 606 (Fla. 1994), 46 FLA. L. REV. 687 (1994). 
268 See Clausen, supra note 268. 
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who are subjected to harassing and threatening treatment by officers 
of the court who act with impunity, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation where a fair and just legal process has occurred. However, 
this outrageous and abusive behavior is particularly damaging and 
offensive in the family law court system where the raw emotional 
nature of the parties runs very high, and it is especially likely to 
occur because of the discretion afforded family law court judges.269  
 DV abusers can use absolute privilege to re-victimize their 
victims without concern over legal repercussions.270 Through the 
protection of absolute privilege as an affirmative defense to any 
lawsuit brought against him for statements and actions made against 
a DV victim, an attorney can defame, harass, and threaten her during 
the course of litigation or in connection with contemplated 
litigation; and he is immune from liability for the defamatory 
statement by using the affirmative defense of absolute privilege.271 
The net effect of absolute privilege is the manipulation by DV 
abusers of the family law court system and the denial of DV victims’ 
equal protection of the laws.272 This creates an even greater power 
and control imbalance between the abuser and his victim, resulting 
in gender inequalities within the court. Absolute privilege can 
exacerbate the already difficult tasks facing DV victims who cannot 
handle the seemingly simplest of perfunctory legal requirements 
with rational thought.273 Simultaneously, the DV victim knows that 
the abuser is signaling to her that she is under his power and control, 
causing her to view his abusiveness as omnipresent.274 
 The continued reinforcement of the absolute privilege 
doctrine by appellate courts and the expansion of the doctrine to 
privilege any and all communications and actions by parties within 
a proceeding, or contemplated proceeding, places DV victims in a 
precarious position of vulnerability and places DV abusers in a 
                                                
269 See Clausen, supra note 268; See also King, supra note 5. 
270 See King, supra note 5, at 169.  
271 See King, supra note 5, at 168-69.  
272 See King, supra note 5, at 168.  
273 See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9. 
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position of power. 275  Courts favor employing a liberal rule in 
finding communications or actions absolutely privileged. 276 
Cavalierly, courts rule that because litigation is adversarial, 
“‘[f]eelings are often wounded and reputations are sometimes 
maligned.’” 277  The absolute privilege doctrine expansion is 
generally justified by the concept that “an occasional unfair result, 
fraudulent communication, or perjured testimony was the price to 
be paid for free access to the courts without fear of harassing 
derivative tort actions.”278 This justification fails to recognize that a 
DV victim, who suffers with PTSD, has her fundamental right to 
free access to the courts infringed upon when a blind application of 
absolute privilege is given to a DV abuser whose intent is to harass 
and intimidate his victim within the judicial system.279  
 If courts blindly apply a liberal interpretation of absolute 
privilege to all actions and communications committed by a DV 
abuser, a DV victim with PTSD is unable to withstand the onslaught 
from her abuser and is unable to realize a just result. A DV abuser 
can shield himself from tort actions and institute illegitimate 
litigation strategies for the purposes of harming his victim through 
abusive and harassing language deployed through court documents, 
as well as interrogatory and deposition questions. A DV abuser can 
force his victim to defend baseless accusations in pleadings, costing 
his victim time, money, and peace of mind; the types of resources a 
DV victim rarely possesses.  
The alternative to allowing tort actions as remedies for 
litigants who are wronged within a civil litigation dispute is the 
court’s power to sanction a party or attorney.280 Family law courts 
                                                
275 See generally Clausen, supra note 268; See also Brigner, supra note 16, at 13-
3 to -5, 13-12. 
276 See Estate of Mayer v. Lax, Inc., 998 N. E.2d 238, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
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are given wide discretion to evaluate what constitutes sanctionable 
conduct.281 Unfortunately, conduct that typically rises to the level 
of outrageousness that will draw punitive sanctions from a family 
law court are well beyond the boundaries of tolerable conduct for a 
DV victim with PTSD. 282  Courts deciding whether to sanction 
litigants or attorneys for egregious conduct weigh the conduct next 
to a reasonable person standard, a standard based on gendered 
foundations and meant to cover actions experienced by individuals 
not diagnosed with PTSD stemming from DV.283 As a result of the 
DV from her abuser who she now faces in court, the DV victim with 
PTSD has damaged tolerance levels which are far below the 
tolerance levels associated with a reasonable person standard.284 
Courts that neglect to apply a subjective standard of conduct, based 
upon what a DV victim with PTSD can tolerate, does the victim a 
disservice by failing to administer justice properly.285 
VI. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A 
PATH TO RELIEF FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS WITH PTSD 
“Pursuing one’s rights under the ADA constitutes a protected 
activity.”286 
 
 The Americans with Disabilities Act was signed into law by 
President George H. W. Bush on July 26, 1990.287 President Bush 
                                                
281 See Aneson, supra note 248, at 13-3 to -5, 13-12; Brigner, supra note 16, at 
13-3 to -5, 13-12. 
282 See generally Stark, supra note 105. 
283 See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9; See generally Stark, supra note 
105. 
284 See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9; See generally Stark, supra note 
105. 
285 See Dragiewicz, supra note 92, at 5-8 to -9; See generally Stark, supra note 
105 (emphasis added). 
286 Pardi v. Kaiser Permanente Hosp., 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). 
287  Maryann Jones, And Access for All: Accommodating Individuals with 
Disabilities in the California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. Rev. 75, 77 (1998). 
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recognized that people with disabilities made up the largest minority 
group in the United States.288 At the time, the ADA was considered 
a piece of landmark legislation because it was passed, in part, to 
ensure disabled persons’ acceptance into places of public 
accommodations.289  
A. What is the ADA? 
 The ADA was enacted to “eliminate discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities” as well as to ensure the federal 
governments’ enforcement of the law.290 Specifically, Title II of the 
ADA ensures that individuals with disabilities are protected against 
discrimination, including in places of public services such as state 
court systems.291 Title II states: “[N]o qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.” 292  “Title II . . . prohibits ‘public entities’ from 
discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability . . . As 
public entities, state court systems are mandated by the ADA to 
address the needs of people with functional limitations and provide 
them equal access to justice.”293 Title II ensures that people with 
disabilities have an “active[] and meaningful[] participat[ion] in the 
state judicial system.”294  
 The justice system is an institution that provides hope to 
those who have found none anywhere else for injuries suffered in 
                                                
288 Id.. 
289  Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All… The Americans with 
Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 123 (1994). 
290 Id. at 124. 
291 Id. 
292 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2008).  
293 Jeanne A. Dooley and Erica F. Wood, ‘Program Accessibility’: How Courts 
Can Accommodate People with Disabilities, 76 JUDICATURE 250, 250 (1993). 
294 Peter Blanck, Ann Wilichowski, and James Schmeling, Disability Civil Rights 
Law and Policy: Accessible Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 825, 841 (2004). 
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the context of economics, politics, or social status.295 Fair access to 
courts is considered a fundamental right in any system of 
government where justice remains a vital core value.296 However, 
access to justice has been a struggle for people with disabilities, who 
still labor to obtain any form of  meaningful participation in our 
legal system. 297  When amending the ADA in 2008, Congress 
acknowledged that individuals with disabilities often experience 
discrimination for which they have “no legal recourse to redress 
such discrimination.” 298  Still, despite the passage of the ADA, 
barriers to meaningful access to justice for people with disabilities 
still remain, resulting in some individuals with disabilities being 
denied relevant, substantial participation in court proceedings.299  
 The ADA requires that state court systems make its facilities 
and programs accessible to qualified individuals with disabilities.300 
As barriers to participation are discovered, the ADA mandates that 
a state court system “must reasonably modify its policies, practices 
or procedures to allow participation by a person with a 
disability.” 301  Historically, disabled persons have been denied 
active participation in the courts and equal protection of the laws.302 
However, under the ADA, no individual with a qualified disability 
shall be denied complete participation in the judicial system or be 
discriminated against due to the nature of their disability.303  
                                                
295  Stephanie Ortoleva, Inaccessible Justice: Human Rights, Persons with 
Disabilities and the Legal System, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 281, 285 (2011). 
296 Blanck, Wilichowski, and Schmeling, supra note 295, at 825. 
297 Id.; accord Ortoleva, supra note 296, at 287. 
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B. Under the ADA: What is a Disabled Person and 
what constitutes  discrimination? 
 Under the ADA, to qualify as an individual with a disability, 
that individual must have “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual.”304 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 focuses on the 
disability’s impairment of an individual’s substantial limitation of 
one major life activity and does not require more than one activity’s 
substantial limitation in order to qualify as a disability under the 
ADA. 305  Historically, for psychiatric conditions, courts used 
diagnoses from the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual when evaluating whether a specific 
condition meets the impairment criteria of the ADA.306 Diagnoses 
that courts recognize as potentially disabling include, but are not 
limited to, “major psychiatric diseases such as schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, and depression, as well as most of the anxiety 
disorders such as panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
claustrophobia, and agoraphobia.”307 The legislative history of the 
ADA makes clear that a person is qualified for protection if one has, 
among others, an “emotional illness.”308 Further, a litigant, who, 
because of “brain injuries,” cannot adequately and consistently 
communicate with her attorney, is “incapable of assisting in a 
meaningful way in the conduct of a civil case . . . [and] is therefore 
disabled, within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).”309 
                                                
304 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2008). 
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 Judges will frequently employ sanist beliefs in decision-
making.310 By doing so, they incorporate sanist beliefs by using 
erroneous “‘common sense’, heuristic reasoning, and biased 
stereotyping” to rationalize their rulings.311 Sanism is grounded in 
“myths, superstitions, and de-individualization.” 312  Judges who 
demand strict adherence to courtroom rules and procedures may 
employ sanist attitudes and behavior when punishing litigants who 
do not conform to courtroom decorum.313 As discussed above, such 
discriminatory behavior by judges is particularly precarious for DV 
victims with PTSD due to the multiple negative stereotypes of 
gender bias and sanist beliefs against PTSD.314 The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in School Board. of Nassau County v. Arline, opined that the 
ignorant behavior and sanist attitudes can be “as handicapping as 
the physical limitations which flow from the impairment.”315 An 
inflexible judge implementing insensitive and rigid courtroom 
procedures runs afoul of discriminatory and unjust treatment against 
the entire disabled community.316 
C. Under the ADA: When federal law is superior to 
the absolute privilege 
 The ADA, a federal civil rights law analogous to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, is superior to state laws when an actual conflict 
exists.317 In Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the U.S. Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals heard a discrimination dispute based upon 
                                                
310  See Gould, supra note 25, at 138-39 (“Sanism is an irrational prejudice 
directed at persons with mental disabilities…”) 
311 Gould, supra note 25, at 139. 
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a conflict with absolute privilege under state and federal law.318 The 
Ninth Circuit in Pardi reaffirmed that when the purposes and 
objectives of a federal law are stymied by state law, the federal law 
must prevail.319 Additionally, the Pardi court stated that actions 
taken by persons, which are wrongful under federal law, cannot be 
held as protected from liability by a state immunity statute.320  
 The plaintiff in Pardi, suffering from depression, a mental 
disorder recognized by the ADA, asserted that the ADA provided a 
remedy from harm caused by discriminatory conduct by the 
defendant. 321  The defendant asserted that the absolute privilege 
under state law provided immunity from liability.322  The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed with the defendant and held that, because of the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the state absolute 
privilege statute did not immunize the defendant.323 In fact, the 
Pardi court clearly held that the ADA’s provisions ensure 
protection for disabled persons who experience any failure of 
accommodations covered under the ADA.324 This ruling suggests 
that the state doctrine of absolute privilege would not protect those 
who are liable for any violation of the ADA during the course of 
litigation, especially in the case of a lack of accommodations for a 
DV victim with PTSD.325 Thus, modifications for a DV victim, who 
suffers from PTSD, is a realistic solution to the problem of 
continuing to place DV victims in the position of being re-
victimized through abusive court procedures, especially when 
absolute privilege provides unfettered access to the victim by the 
abuser. Under the ADA, a DV victim with PTSD is safeguarded 
from the continued abuse by a DV abuser within the forum of 
litigation, a state run public entity.  
                                                
318 Pardi, 389 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2004). 
319 See Id. at 851. 
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D. Under the ADA: Court Accommodations for 
PTSD? 
 In the twenty-five plus years since the enactment of the 
ADA, public accommodations for people with disabilities has seen 
an ever growing sensitivity to “architectural barriers faced by 
physically challenged persons.” 326  It is extremely common, for 
example, to find wheelchair accessible ramps to sidewalks, retail 
stores, and many other public areas. 327  It is an understandable 
heuristic response to look for “commonly accepted solutions” for 
accommodations, like ramps for wheelchair accessibility, braille 
placards for sight impairment, and sign language use for hearing 
impairment. 328  Judges will often think of other “commonly 
accepted methods of accommodation when determining individual 
needs within the courtroom.”329 It stands to reason, then, that a 
litigant “who is not [overtly] physically challenged, but has a mental 
or emotional impairment . . . has a more difficult task when seeking 
accommodations.”330 
 The ADA requires public entities, which includes all courts, 
“to avoid discrimination against persons with disabilities and to 
make reasonable modifications in order to accommodate 
individuals with disabilities.”331 “The ADA requires . . . reasonable 
accommodations and covers not only those policies and procedures 
that intentionally exclude those with disabilities, but also ‘facially 
neutral barriers’ that work to discriminate against these 
individuals.”332 The ADA demands nothing less than the integration 
of courtroom procedures for people with disabilities.333 The ADA’s 
requirement on courts to modify processes and procedures for 
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people with disabilities is subject to the ADA’s “‘fundamental 
alterations in the services provided’ and ‘undue burden’ 
exception.”334   
 If a DV victim with PTSD has problems conforming to the 
strict rules of the local courthouse, what kinds of accommodations 
would be viable?335 As a start, the trial judge could allow frequent 
breaks, time spent with a support person like a therapist, and 
limitations on courtroom observers.336 A DV victim with PTSD 
could benefit from court instructions that were broken down into 
smaller steps, the court could provide positive feedback to the DV 
victim, and the court could modify the courtroom procedures to 
accommodate the PTSD sufferer’s limited attention span. 337 
Additionally, the court could “arrange for morning and afternoon 
transcripts” for a DV victim with PTSD “who is confused by verbal 
instructions or who has short-term memory loss.” 338 
Accommodations for litigants, who suffer from brain injuries such 
as PTSD, could be implemented to allow for their “safety and 
comfort and be cared for properly during the proceedings.”339 It 
would be difficult to imagine that accommodations for at least 
medical support would fundamentally alter the nature of the court 
proceeding.340  Moreover, the court’s understanding that the DV 
victim with PTSD may utilize a service dog is helpful as well as the 
fact that in camera hearings may be needed when she is required to 
testify. Eliminating the burden from having to face her abuser, 
otherwise placed on the DV victim suffering from PTSD, will allow 
the court to see her in a less agitated state, placing all sides of the 
litigation on more equal footing.  
 Ultimately, the burden to provide reasonable 
accommodations in court for a DV victim with PTSD falls on the 
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presiding judge. 341  It is required that the court holding the 
proceeding give primary consideration to the requests of the 
individual with the disability when determining what types of 
accommodations are necessary.342 Most likely, an accommodation 
request from a DV victim with PTSD would come prior to the 
commencement of a courtroom proceeding through a written 
motion filed with the court and provided to opposing counsel.343 
However, the court may need to make accommodation rulings sua 
sponte in the event that the circumstances warrant such an action.344  
By filing a written motion requesting accommodations, it allows the 
court to rule using a written order to preserve the request for 
possible appellate rights. 345  An accommodations request is 
reviewed under a reasonableness test by the court and is subject to 
analysis as to whether the request would “‘fundamentally alter the 
nature of the activity’ or [if] the accommodation [would] place[] 
and [sic] undue financial or administrative burden on the [court].”346 
However, modifications to court procedures and reasonable 
accommodations do not equate to high monetary expenditures and 
may simply require procedural flexibility.347  
 If an accommodations request is denied, “the regulations 
state that the decision to refuse an accommodation must be made by 
a high-level official who has budgetary authority and responsibility 
for making spending decisions.”348 Although courts are not required 
to authorize modifications to procedures or accommodations that 
“result in a ‘fundamental alteration of [a] program or service, or 
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cause an ‘undue financial or administrative burden,’”349 the court 
administration has the “burden of proof to establish financial or 
administrative hardship, or the demonstration that the 
accommodation would result in a fundamental alteration in the 
nature of the service, program, or activity.”350 Ominously, if a court 
refuses to consider necessary accommodations for a DV victim with 
PTSD, it is likely that the functioning capabilities of the victim will 
be reduced.351 Most likely, this inaction by the court will lead to the 
DV victim with PTSD experiencing an “inability to understand, 
follow, or actively participate in the proceedings,” requiring her to 
find an ADA attorney to work to enforce her legal rights under the 
ADA.352  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Domestic violence, a part of a pattern of power and control 
by men, has economic, societal and legal impacts that are 
devastating to women.353 As previously discussed, DV may often 
lead to PTSD in victims which can negatively affect outcomes in 
court for the victims.354 Abusers will frequently continue to abuse 
their DV victims within the legal system through the perversion of 
absolute privilege, resulting in disastrous outcomes for the victim 
suffering from PTSD.355 The family law courts can be an extremely 
hostile environment for DV victims in which the adversarial nature 
of litigation favors the abuser. 356  Gender and litigation biases 
permeate the family law courts and create a condition in which a 
DV victim with PTSD may agree to a settlement, to her detriment, 
to avoid the agonizing litigation process as well as gambling on a 
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family law judge who is often overwhelmed, has immense 
discretion, and is suspicious of her presentation in court due to her 
PTSD.357 
 In order to cause the institution of law to become a more 
effective and just apparatus for women who are DV victims, more 
women and men in the legal community must choose and execute a 
plan that pushes back against the boundaries of the male legal view 
that currently dominates the law.358 To compensate for the gendered 
nature of law and the inherently adversarial nature of the legal 
system, reforms to the affirmative defense of the absolute privilege 
provided to abusers within the family law system should be 
implemented to protect injured DV victims who suffer from PTSD. 
Absolute privilege and the abusive nature of the adversarial system 
should be modified in those instances involving DV victims whose 
traumatic experiences have severely injured them psychologically.  
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